SB 572 and its combination of an additional 0.25% Regional Transportation Authority sales tax and an increase in the real estate transfer tax in the City of Chicago appears to be dead. In a letter co-authored by House Speaker Michael Madigan and Representative Julie Hamos, the moving force behind SB 572, they indicated that they would support the approach contained in HB 4161, namely, a transfer of most of the sales tax revenue on fuel collected in the six-county RTA region from the State General Fund to transit.
The slightly revised version of HB 4161 that they will put forth will retain--as does HB 4161--the "reform components of Senate Bill 572, which include substantial pension and benefit concessions from transit unions and other requirements to protect the best interests of taxpayers and transit riders."
The fact sheet attached to the letter states that SB 572 would have raised $530 million of new money. HB 4161 and the Madigan/Hamos alternative plan will raise $440 million in new money. It is unclear if the difference is to be made up by a fare increase, which some support, or is money not absolutely needed by the Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace in the first place to maintain current fares and service levels.
It is way too soon for transit supporters to break out the champagne, however. Representatives from both parties, primarily from Downstate, have held up action on a transit funding package because they want a capital program for highways and schools. If the Madigan/Hamos bill comes up for a vote on Wednesday, as scheduled, and there is no such capital program in place, then it is quite possible that the successor of SB 572 could be voted down, just as was SB 572 in early September.
I bet those grunts in the Department of Revenue and elsewhere who are responsible for protecting the State's fisc are tearing their hair out at this development. Under SB 572 the State would be putting up $150 million in new money. Under the HB 4161 approach the State will have to come up with $385 million in new money for transit.
Stay tuned.
Showing posts with label SB 572. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SB 572. Show all posts
Monday, November 26, 2007
Friday, November 23, 2007
SB 572 Meets The Alternative
In many quarters, including editorial boards, the notion that there is any alternative to SB 572 and its regional sales tax increase is treated dismissively. There is an alternative, however, and that is HB 4161, which was introduced by Representative Saviano, is co-sponsored by seven Republican colleagues, and appears to supported by Governor Blagojevich. HB 4161 uses a portion of the sales tax collected on gasoline sold in the six-county area that makes up the jurisdiction of the Regional Transportation Authority to fund public transit operations at the Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace. At first glance, HB 4161 appears to contain many if not most of the so-called reforms of the RTA that are contained in SB 572.
The best description of HB 4161 I've seen is this letter to the editor in today's edition of the Lake County News-Sun from Representative Sandy Cole, reprinted in full below in the interest of giving a full hearing to an alternative to SB 572:
Equitable funding for mass transit
November 23, 2007
As a chief co-sponsor of House Bill 4161 (Regional Transportation Support Fund), I would like to take this opportunity to clarify an erroneous assumption made by your Nov. 20 editorial about the proposed redirection of the state sales tax on gasoline to mass transit ("Political dallying").
New construction for Lake County roads would not be impacted, as was concluded. There is a gross misconception by both the media and the public that the gasoline sales tax and the motor fuel tax are one and the same. They are not. As with all appropriation legislation, the devil is in the details.
In Illinois, gasoline and diesel are subject to a sales tax at a rate of 6.25 percent. The state retains 5 percent of the collected revenues and the remaining 1.25 percent is disbursed to local governments. The state's portion of sales tax revenue is generally deposited into the General Revenue Fund and used toward general government expenses.
HB4161 would redirect the state's portion (5 percent) of the tax revenues to a proposed Regional Transportation Support Fund. According to the Illinois Department of Revenue, that portion will be approximately $385 million in 2008. The difference left in the General Revenue Fund by this redirection of funds would be bolstered by other new revenue sources, such as additional gaming positions at existing casinos or closing corporate loopholes.
In addition, the state imposes a Motor Fuel Tax (19 cents per gallon of gasoline, 21.5 cents per gallon of diesel). This is a tax for state roads and the proceeds go toward road building projects, including those in Lake County.
In 2006, the state collected about $1.4 billion in Motor Fuel Tax revenues. All Motor Fuel Tax revenue is deposited in the Motor Fuel Tax Fund and is distributed per a formula set in state statute.
Combined with modest fare increases, the provisions of HB4161 offer the same level of funding as Senate Bill 572 without tax increases. HB4161 has proposed fare increases (10 percent in 2008 to generate $73 million and another 5 percent in 2009 to generate $50 million) that are both minimal and reasonable.
Between 2001 and 2006, the price of gasoline has increased 68 percent, but CTA cash fares have only increased 15 percent. It is fair to expect riders to pay for increased fares, just like motorists have to pay more for gasoline.
SB572 did not include a fare increase because it relied on tax increases. HB4161 is based on the premise that those who use the service should help pay for it. Of course, they cannot be expected to pay all of the costs of maintaining the mass transit system, but transit riders should pay a fair share.
Without a doubt, I support increased mass transit funding and believe that the gas sales tax proposal is a more responsible alternative for resolving the mass transit funding crisis than raising taxes on families and seniors. Raising taxes should always be our last priority, not our first.
The best description of HB 4161 I've seen is this letter to the editor in today's edition of the Lake County News-Sun from Representative Sandy Cole, reprinted in full below in the interest of giving a full hearing to an alternative to SB 572:
Equitable funding for mass transit
November 23, 2007
As a chief co-sponsor of House Bill 4161 (Regional Transportation Support Fund), I would like to take this opportunity to clarify an erroneous assumption made by your Nov. 20 editorial about the proposed redirection of the state sales tax on gasoline to mass transit ("Political dallying").
New construction for Lake County roads would not be impacted, as was concluded. There is a gross misconception by both the media and the public that the gasoline sales tax and the motor fuel tax are one and the same. They are not. As with all appropriation legislation, the devil is in the details.
In Illinois, gasoline and diesel are subject to a sales tax at a rate of 6.25 percent. The state retains 5 percent of the collected revenues and the remaining 1.25 percent is disbursed to local governments. The state's portion of sales tax revenue is generally deposited into the General Revenue Fund and used toward general government expenses.
HB4161 would redirect the state's portion (5 percent) of the tax revenues to a proposed Regional Transportation Support Fund. According to the Illinois Department of Revenue, that portion will be approximately $385 million in 2008. The difference left in the General Revenue Fund by this redirection of funds would be bolstered by other new revenue sources, such as additional gaming positions at existing casinos or closing corporate loopholes.
In addition, the state imposes a Motor Fuel Tax (19 cents per gallon of gasoline, 21.5 cents per gallon of diesel). This is a tax for state roads and the proceeds go toward road building projects, including those in Lake County.
In 2006, the state collected about $1.4 billion in Motor Fuel Tax revenues. All Motor Fuel Tax revenue is deposited in the Motor Fuel Tax Fund and is distributed per a formula set in state statute.
Combined with modest fare increases, the provisions of HB4161 offer the same level of funding as Senate Bill 572 without tax increases. HB4161 has proposed fare increases (10 percent in 2008 to generate $73 million and another 5 percent in 2009 to generate $50 million) that are both minimal and reasonable.
Between 2001 and 2006, the price of gasoline has increased 68 percent, but CTA cash fares have only increased 15 percent. It is fair to expect riders to pay for increased fares, just like motorists have to pay more for gasoline.
SB572 did not include a fare increase because it relied on tax increases. HB4161 is based on the premise that those who use the service should help pay for it. Of course, they cannot be expected to pay all of the costs of maintaining the mass transit system, but transit riders should pay a fair share.
Without a doubt, I support increased mass transit funding and believe that the gas sales tax proposal is a more responsible alternative for resolving the mass transit funding crisis than raising taxes on families and seniors. Raising taxes should always be our last priority, not our first.
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Chicago Mayor Says Think Different
The Mayor of Chicago has challenged the State to be "creative" when it comes to solving the public transit funding problem. Fresh from raising property taxes in Chicago, the Mayor also criticized the Governor for his opposition to increasing sales taxes in the six-county Regional Transportation Authority region So, let's get modestly creative and suggest that the following provisions be included in the final transit bill:
1. Indexed Fare Increases. Index fares to some reasonable measure such as the Consumer Price Index, perhaps capping increases at 4% annually to avoid sudden spikes. This provision will address the concerns of certain parties that a fare increase be part of a funding solution and allow the service boards--Chicago Transit Authority, Metra, Pace--to avoid the counter-productive cycles of putting off fare increases too long and then raising them too sharply. Indexing public transit fares provides a nice precedent for using a similar index to periodically increase the state gas tax to help protect its yield in real dollars.
2. Direct State Role In RTA . Take a board member from each of the three RTA subregions--City of Chicago, suburban Cook County and the collar counties--and make them gubernatorial appointments subject to Senate approval. Make the RTA Chairman a gubernatorial appointment. This State role is commensurate to the State's financial contribution to the public transit system in northeastern Illinois and the important role of that system in the State's transportation system.
3. Hold RTA Accountable. Currently, the RTA can reject service board budgets that do not meet the statutory requirements. The service board then suffers a financial penalty, namely, loss of their share of Public Transportation Fund monies from the State. The RTA, however, suffers no financial penalty if it is derlict in its duties by, for example, allowing service levels to grow faster than revenues over an extended period (as the Auditor General found) or approving unbalanced budgets with plug numbers for hoped-for contributions from the State to cover major deficits (as the RTA did in FY 2007). Some portion of the RTA's funding for its own administration should be subject to being withdrawn if the RTA fails to perform. This provision would apply only if the RTA remained as just a financial oversight agency. (See #5 below.)
4. Tie Transit To Land Use. Explicitly tie transit investments to land use. Write in the RTA Act a requirement that the RTA prioritize transit investment and service to regions and communities that support transit oriented development. (This is not necessarily a gimme for Chicago. Its embrace of big box retailing and minimum parking space requirements for new residential construction, for example, might put it below some suburban communities that are trying to build TOD developments around Metra stations.)
5. Restructure The RTA And The Service Boards. Combine CTA bus operations and Pace mainline bus operations into one operating unit. Pace's paratransit, vanpool and demand response service becomes another unit. CTA rail and Metra become their own units. These become purely operating units tucked into the RTA. This means that the separate boards of directors of the service boards would be abolished. Rather, the RTA and its board would have ultimate operating responsibility for public transit in the region.
Find a funding source, pass these provisions and be done with it. There certainly are more creative ideas--e.g., emergency oversight agency; combining RTA, IDOT District 1 and the Tollway; and heavy investment in alternative automobile technology (e.g., plug in hybrids)--but these provisions with the exception of #5 could be tucked into SB 572 or its successor pretty easily.
1. Indexed Fare Increases. Index fares to some reasonable measure such as the Consumer Price Index, perhaps capping increases at 4% annually to avoid sudden spikes. This provision will address the concerns of certain parties that a fare increase be part of a funding solution and allow the service boards--Chicago Transit Authority, Metra, Pace--to avoid the counter-productive cycles of putting off fare increases too long and then raising them too sharply. Indexing public transit fares provides a nice precedent for using a similar index to periodically increase the state gas tax to help protect its yield in real dollars.
2. Direct State Role In RTA . Take a board member from each of the three RTA subregions--City of Chicago, suburban Cook County and the collar counties--and make them gubernatorial appointments subject to Senate approval. Make the RTA Chairman a gubernatorial appointment. This State role is commensurate to the State's financial contribution to the public transit system in northeastern Illinois and the important role of that system in the State's transportation system.
3. Hold RTA Accountable. Currently, the RTA can reject service board budgets that do not meet the statutory requirements. The service board then suffers a financial penalty, namely, loss of their share of Public Transportation Fund monies from the State. The RTA, however, suffers no financial penalty if it is derlict in its duties by, for example, allowing service levels to grow faster than revenues over an extended period (as the Auditor General found) or approving unbalanced budgets with plug numbers for hoped-for contributions from the State to cover major deficits (as the RTA did in FY 2007). Some portion of the RTA's funding for its own administration should be subject to being withdrawn if the RTA fails to perform. This provision would apply only if the RTA remained as just a financial oversight agency. (See #5 below.)
4. Tie Transit To Land Use. Explicitly tie transit investments to land use. Write in the RTA Act a requirement that the RTA prioritize transit investment and service to regions and communities that support transit oriented development. (This is not necessarily a gimme for Chicago. Its embrace of big box retailing and minimum parking space requirements for new residential construction, for example, might put it below some suburban communities that are trying to build TOD developments around Metra stations.)
5. Restructure The RTA And The Service Boards. Combine CTA bus operations and Pace mainline bus operations into one operating unit. Pace's paratransit, vanpool and demand response service becomes another unit. CTA rail and Metra become their own units. These become purely operating units tucked into the RTA. This means that the separate boards of directors of the service boards would be abolished. Rather, the RTA and its board would have ultimate operating responsibility for public transit in the region.
Find a funding source, pass these provisions and be done with it. There certainly are more creative ideas--e.g., emergency oversight agency; combining RTA, IDOT District 1 and the Tollway; and heavy investment in alternative automobile technology (e.g., plug in hybrids)--but these provisions with the exception of #5 could be tucked into SB 572 or its successor pretty easily.
Saturday, November 17, 2007
CTA Cost Structure: Background
The previous post outlined how the Chicago Transit Authority's bus operations appears to be significantly less cost-effective than Pace's bus operations in terms of the cost of putting vehicles on the streets (because of its higher ridership the CTA does better on a per passenger cost basis).
This extensively researched article by Stacy Warden in Chi-Town Daily News outlines how the CTA's high pension costs and wages contribute to its overall high cost structure and the series of events that resulted in the CTA's unmanageable pension costs. This article briefly outlines the five year labor agreement that is embedded in SB 572 and attempts to address pension costs.
This extensively researched article by Stacy Warden in Chi-Town Daily News outlines how the CTA's high pension costs and wages contribute to its overall high cost structure and the series of events that resulted in the CTA's unmanageable pension costs. This article briefly outlines the five year labor agreement that is embedded in SB 572 and attempts to address pension costs.
Pace Laps The CTA On Cost Effectiveness Of Bus Operations: Implications For Transit Funding Crisis
A recent post indicated that Pace's financial situation is more dire than the Chicago Transit Authority's financial situation according to some basic measures such as unfunded operating deficit as percentage of revenue.
There is another side to the Pace story, however, and that is the relative cost effectiveness of its bus service. According to the Federal Transit Administration's National Transit Database 2006 reports for Pace and the CTA the "service efficiency" figures covering Pace and CTA bus service are as follows:
Operating Expense Per Vehicle Revenue Mile
Pace: $6.37
CTA: $12.50
CTA 96.2% higher
Operating Expense Per Vehicle Revenue Hour
Pace: $89.28
CTA: $123.17
CTA 40% higher
Operating Expenses Per Passenger Mile
Pace: $0.58
CTA: $1.11
CTA 91.4% higher
Operating Expenses Per Unlinked Passenger Trip
Pace: $3.87
CTA: $2.77
Pace 39.7% higher
Unlinked Passenger Trips Per Vehicle Revenue Mile
Pace: 1.65
CTA: 4.51
CTA 173.3% higher
Unlinked Passenger Trips Per Vehicle Revenue Hour
Pace: 23.07
CTA: 44.39
CTA 92.4% higher
Ignoring for a moment the costs associated with putting a bus on the street, CTA bus service is more effective than Pace's bus service because CTA buses carry more passengers per hour of operation and mile traveled. The greater number of CTA bus passengers per vehicle hour and per bus trip means that the CTA's operating expense per passenger ($2.77) is less than Pace's operating expense per passenger ($3.87).
Pace, however, is much more cost effective than the CTA in putting buses on the street. Its operating expense per vehicle mile and per passenger mile are only slightly more than half of the CTA's operating expense according to these measures. The CTA's operating expense per vehicle revenue hour is 40 percent higher than Pace's.
These results might be skewed in Pace's favor for at least two reasons. First, Pace's operating environment--suburban streets and highways--and lighter passenger loads result in fewer stops and starts that eat up fuel and equipment. Second, the CTA's bus fleet is older than Pace's bus fleet, so the CTA incurs higher repair costs because of the greater frequency of mechanical breakdowns.
So let's assume that Pace's bus service is 19.1 percent more cost effective than the CTA's bus service in terms of putting buses on the street. This 19.1 percent figure is conservative, representing less than half the lowest cost-effectiveness advantage that the FTA data shows that Pace has over the CTA.
Now apply this 19.1 percent cost savings figure to the 2006 operating expense for CTA bus service that the CTA reported to the FTA ($828,100,714). That yields $158.2 million, the very amount of the CTA's projected FY 2008 unfunded operating deficit that is behind the push to pass SB 572 and the many months of machinations connected therewith. In other words, if the CTA's bus service were as cost effective as Pace's bus service it appears there would be no unfunded CTA operating deficit.
Those opposing SB 572 might focus on finding a way to apply Pace's cost structure for its bus operations to the CTA's bus operations. Those supporting SB 572 might reflect on how the relative cost ineffectiveness of CTA bus operations compared to another public transit agency providing bus service in same metropolitan area dampens the appetite for a sales tax increase, and modify their legislative strategy accordingly.
Pace has already taken on ADA paratransit operations for the six-county region that makes up the Regional Transportation Authority's service area. Is there a way for that to happen for mainline bus service while preserving Pace's lower cost structure?
There is another side to the Pace story, however, and that is the relative cost effectiveness of its bus service. According to the Federal Transit Administration's National Transit Database 2006 reports for Pace and the CTA the "service efficiency" figures covering Pace and CTA bus service are as follows:
Operating Expense Per Vehicle Revenue Mile
Pace: $6.37
CTA: $12.50
CTA 96.2% higher
Operating Expense Per Vehicle Revenue Hour
Pace: $89.28
CTA: $123.17
CTA 40% higher
Operating Expenses Per Passenger Mile
Pace: $0.58
CTA: $1.11
CTA 91.4% higher
Operating Expenses Per Unlinked Passenger Trip
Pace: $3.87
CTA: $2.77
Pace 39.7% higher
Unlinked Passenger Trips Per Vehicle Revenue Mile
Pace: 1.65
CTA: 4.51
CTA 173.3% higher
Unlinked Passenger Trips Per Vehicle Revenue Hour
Pace: 23.07
CTA: 44.39
CTA 92.4% higher
Ignoring for a moment the costs associated with putting a bus on the street, CTA bus service is more effective than Pace's bus service because CTA buses carry more passengers per hour of operation and mile traveled. The greater number of CTA bus passengers per vehicle hour and per bus trip means that the CTA's operating expense per passenger ($2.77) is less than Pace's operating expense per passenger ($3.87).
Pace, however, is much more cost effective than the CTA in putting buses on the street. Its operating expense per vehicle mile and per passenger mile are only slightly more than half of the CTA's operating expense according to these measures. The CTA's operating expense per vehicle revenue hour is 40 percent higher than Pace's.
These results might be skewed in Pace's favor for at least two reasons. First, Pace's operating environment--suburban streets and highways--and lighter passenger loads result in fewer stops and starts that eat up fuel and equipment. Second, the CTA's bus fleet is older than Pace's bus fleet, so the CTA incurs higher repair costs because of the greater frequency of mechanical breakdowns.
So let's assume that Pace's bus service is 19.1 percent more cost effective than the CTA's bus service in terms of putting buses on the street. This 19.1 percent figure is conservative, representing less than half the lowest cost-effectiveness advantage that the FTA data shows that Pace has over the CTA.
Now apply this 19.1 percent cost savings figure to the 2006 operating expense for CTA bus service that the CTA reported to the FTA ($828,100,714). That yields $158.2 million, the very amount of the CTA's projected FY 2008 unfunded operating deficit that is behind the push to pass SB 572 and the many months of machinations connected therewith. In other words, if the CTA's bus service were as cost effective as Pace's bus service it appears there would be no unfunded CTA operating deficit.
Those opposing SB 572 might focus on finding a way to apply Pace's cost structure for its bus operations to the CTA's bus operations. Those supporting SB 572 might reflect on how the relative cost ineffectiveness of CTA bus operations compared to another public transit agency providing bus service in same metropolitan area dampens the appetite for a sales tax increase, and modify their legislative strategy accordingly.
Pace has already taken on ADA paratransit operations for the six-county region that makes up the Regional Transportation Authority's service area. Is there a way for that to happen for mainline bus service while preserving Pace's lower cost structure?
Grass Roots Anti-SB 572 Efforts
The Moving Beyond Congestion/SB 572 effort has attracted the support of a variety of interest groups, ranging from the genteel (e.g., Metropolitan Planning Council) to those that position themselves more in the community activist mode (e.g., Campaign for Better Transit). These groups have sponsored rallies and email campaigns intended to push for passage of SB 572.
The Illinois Policy Institute, a think tank whose slogan is "free enterprise and limited government for a better Illinois," apparently has been engaged in a grass-roots effort against SB 572. According to a blog post in the Chicago Daily Observer entitled "Kiss that CTA Bailout Goodbye...For Now," the Institute did the following:
The Institute targeted state representatives who were being pressured to vote for the tax increase and called more than 30,000 voters in their districts to urge them to contact their legislators.
* We spread the word to leaders of Americans for Tax Reform, who contacted key members of the Transportation Committee to oppose the tax hike.
* We also notified our friends at the National Taxpayers Union, who subsequently sent out 16,000 emails to their Illinois membership urging their members to oppose this tax increase.
* Our team drafted and placed two op-eds explaining the impending tax hike and its implications.
* We informed both the State Republican Party and House Minority Leader Tom Cross on our strategies to educate policymakers, the public and the press on the threat this tax posed.
* Finally, we hit the airwaves on one of Chicago’s most popular talk radio stations, WLS. Both CEO John Tillman (you can hear his interview here) and President Greg Blankenship went on the air to flesh out the real issues behind the tax hike and to expose its inconsistencies and flaws.
* * *
What other interest groups, if any, have joined the Institute in fighting against the SB 572 and a "bailout" of public transit in northeastern Illinois?
The Illinois Policy Institute, a think tank whose slogan is "free enterprise and limited government for a better Illinois," apparently has been engaged in a grass-roots effort against SB 572. According to a blog post in the Chicago Daily Observer entitled "Kiss that CTA Bailout Goodbye...For Now," the Institute did the following:
The Institute targeted state representatives who were being pressured to vote for the tax increase and called more than 30,000 voters in their districts to urge them to contact their legislators.
* We spread the word to leaders of Americans for Tax Reform, who contacted key members of the Transportation Committee to oppose the tax hike.
* We also notified our friends at the National Taxpayers Union, who subsequently sent out 16,000 emails to their Illinois membership urging their members to oppose this tax increase.
* Our team drafted and placed two op-eds explaining the impending tax hike and its implications.
* We informed both the State Republican Party and House Minority Leader Tom Cross on our strategies to educate policymakers, the public and the press on the threat this tax posed.
* Finally, we hit the airwaves on one of Chicago’s most popular talk radio stations, WLS. Both CEO John Tillman (you can hear his interview here) and President Greg Blankenship went on the air to flesh out the real issues behind the tax hike and to expose its inconsistencies and flaws.
* * *
What other interest groups, if any, have joined the Institute in fighting against the SB 572 and a "bailout" of public transit in northeastern Illinois?
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Shifting Population Landscape: Implications
While the Chicago region's population as a whole is expected to grow at a decent rate over the next 20 years, this general growth masks population shifts within the region that have important implications for the region's transportation system.
This article indicates that the congressional districts represented by Representatives Jan Schakowsky and Rahm Emanuel are among the ten districts in the nation with the fastest shirking populations in the 2000-05 period. Schakowsky's district lost 51,906 (7.9%) of its population during that period, the third greatest decrease in the nation. Emanuel's district lost 33,260 (5.1%) of its population during that period, the eighth largest decrease in the nation.
The national map (here) based on Almanac of American Politics (site) data showing population changes indicates that the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 7th congressional districts also lost population during the 2000-05 period. All of these districts cover the City of Chicago and nearby suburbs.
These congressional districts have the highest population and employment density in the region. For the most part they embody the kind of transit-oriented development so prized these days as an antidote to everything from obesity to global warming. The current level of transit investment and infrastructure in these districts is higher than in the congressional districts farther out from Chicago.
The shift in population away from these high-density, transit-friendly areas to the urban fringe does not bode well for public transit (or the environment) in this region. The loss of population in the urban core cuts away at the sales tax funding base for the Chicago Transit Authority. Transit is harder and more expensive to provide in sprawling exurbs. It also is harder to make the business case for heavy new capital investment in transit when the ridership base of the CTA, which still carries about 80% of the region's transit customers, is shrinking.
Could the current difficulties in finding increased capital and operating funding for the Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace be driven in part by an almost unconscious recognition that the demographic trends in this region are pointing us in the direction of becoming a sprawling, auto-centric region like Detroit (but with a more vibrant downtown) instead of a city like London or Paris with a strong public transit system?
Speaking of which, are there any provisions in SB 572, the long-stalled bill to provide more operating funding for the service boards and "reform" the Regional Transportation Authority, that will help counteract the centrifugal forces that are pulling this region into a development pattern largely inhospitable to transit?
This article indicates that the congressional districts represented by Representatives Jan Schakowsky and Rahm Emanuel are among the ten districts in the nation with the fastest shirking populations in the 2000-05 period. Schakowsky's district lost 51,906 (7.9%) of its population during that period, the third greatest decrease in the nation. Emanuel's district lost 33,260 (5.1%) of its population during that period, the eighth largest decrease in the nation.
The national map (here) based on Almanac of American Politics (site) data showing population changes indicates that the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 7th congressional districts also lost population during the 2000-05 period. All of these districts cover the City of Chicago and nearby suburbs.
These congressional districts have the highest population and employment density in the region. For the most part they embody the kind of transit-oriented development so prized these days as an antidote to everything from obesity to global warming. The current level of transit investment and infrastructure in these districts is higher than in the congressional districts farther out from Chicago.
The shift in population away from these high-density, transit-friendly areas to the urban fringe does not bode well for public transit (or the environment) in this region. The loss of population in the urban core cuts away at the sales tax funding base for the Chicago Transit Authority. Transit is harder and more expensive to provide in sprawling exurbs. It also is harder to make the business case for heavy new capital investment in transit when the ridership base of the CTA, which still carries about 80% of the region's transit customers, is shrinking.
Could the current difficulties in finding increased capital and operating funding for the Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace be driven in part by an almost unconscious recognition that the demographic trends in this region are pointing us in the direction of becoming a sprawling, auto-centric region like Detroit (but with a more vibrant downtown) instead of a city like London or Paris with a strong public transit system?
Speaking of which, are there any provisions in SB 572, the long-stalled bill to provide more operating funding for the service boards and "reform" the Regional Transportation Authority, that will help counteract the centrifugal forces that are pulling this region into a development pattern largely inhospitable to transit?
Thursday, November 8, 2007
Voters And Transit Funding: Why Is This Region So Skittish?
The notion of asking voters in the six county area to approve a regional tax increase to fund public transit seems anathema to transit supporters in this region. Presumably, transit supporters fear that voters will turn down such a tax increase and believe that public transit will fare better in Springfield in the General Assembly. The doomsday cycles of the last few years and the success of transit funding referenda across the country should prompt a re-evaluation of that assumption.
The Center for Transportation Excellence tracks the success of transit funding ballot measures and has found an approval rate of over 50 percent nationwide. The elections earlier this week were no exception. Of the 19 transit funding measures on the ballot 13 were approved by the voters.
The biggest wins for transit came in San Francisco, where voters approved a measure that will increase funding and allow reforms of Muni, and in Charlotte, North Carolina, where voters rejected a repeal of the existing sales tax for transit.
The biggest loss came in Seattle, where voters rejected a measure that would have increased taxes to fund 50 miles of new rail transit and 186 miles of new road lanes. According to this article, however, the defeat might have been because the measure was insufficiently supportive of public transit and thus did not do enough to address global warning. Indeed, the Sierra Club opposed the measure.
Given the tough sledding in Springfield and the national success rate for transit funding referenda, why are transit officials and regional leaders here reluctant to proceed with a transit funding referendum to provide additional funds to the RTA and the three service boards, Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace? After all, public transit has a larger market share here than in most if not all of the areas that have approved transit funding referenda over the past decade.
I suspect that there are two answers. First, transit supporters fear that voters won't agree that the additional funding necessary to stave off doomsday and provide sufficient capital is worth the congestion relief and other benefits from public transit. Second, they fear that the State would not increase its Public Transportation Fund match of the new revenue generated regionally if the referendum did pass.
What would be the result if SB 572 were packaged into a regional referendum? How would you vote?
The Center for Transportation Excellence tracks the success of transit funding ballot measures and has found an approval rate of over 50 percent nationwide. The elections earlier this week were no exception. Of the 19 transit funding measures on the ballot 13 were approved by the voters.
The biggest wins for transit came in San Francisco, where voters approved a measure that will increase funding and allow reforms of Muni, and in Charlotte, North Carolina, where voters rejected a repeal of the existing sales tax for transit.
The biggest loss came in Seattle, where voters rejected a measure that would have increased taxes to fund 50 miles of new rail transit and 186 miles of new road lanes. According to this article, however, the defeat might have been because the measure was insufficiently supportive of public transit and thus did not do enough to address global warning. Indeed, the Sierra Club opposed the measure.
Given the tough sledding in Springfield and the national success rate for transit funding referenda, why are transit officials and regional leaders here reluctant to proceed with a transit funding referendum to provide additional funds to the RTA and the three service boards, Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace? After all, public transit has a larger market share here than in most if not all of the areas that have approved transit funding referenda over the past decade.
I suspect that there are two answers. First, transit supporters fear that voters won't agree that the additional funding necessary to stave off doomsday and provide sufficient capital is worth the congestion relief and other benefits from public transit. Second, they fear that the State would not increase its Public Transportation Fund match of the new revenue generated regionally if the referendum did pass.
What would be the result if SB 572 were packaged into a regional referendum? How would you vote?
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
SB 572: Hope Springs Eternal For Representative Hamos
Representative Julie Hamos has circulated a newsletter discussing SB 572 and the transit funding situation. She describes why SB 572 failed to advance out of the Illinois House as follows:
The House of Representatives returned to Springfield last Thursday with the expectation that there would be a vote on SB 572, our comprehensive transit plan. However, the House Republicans again held firm that they were unwilling to support transit legislation without a capital infrastructure bill. Since transit is a truly regional, bipartisan issue that deserves bipartisan support, it was impossible to pass the transit bill with hardly any Republican support.
The newsletter goes on to note that the Governor and three of the four legislative leaders have pledged to work hard over the next two weeks to craft a long-term transit funding solution by coming up with a state-wide capital plan. (You can access the letters through the Hamos newsletter.) The lone holdout is Senate Minority Leader Frank Watson, perhaps smarting over the less than complete description of SB 572 contained in a letter he received from the RTA recently.
In any event, Representative Hamos closes her newsletter with the following: "I remain hopeful that the leaders will fashion a capital infrastructure bill that will pave the way for a successful vote on SB 572 in the next two weeks."
What, if any, of SB 572 will survive the legislative back and forth over the next days or weeks?
Is transit funding the only issue that needs to be resolved by the Governor and the legislative leaders or are the RTA "reform" provisions also up in the air?
Will the CTA unions agree to honor their concessions if a solution is not enacted before 2008? Are greater concessions possible in 2008 if the CTA's 2008 doomsday is even worse than the 2007 doomsday that was just averted?
Is the Governor or any of the legislative leaders inclined to radically reform the Chicago area public transit system by, for example, combining the Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace into the RTA as operating units of the RTA?
Will enough of SB 572 pass so that Representative Hamos can feel like the effort she has put into this issue has been worthwhile?
The House of Representatives returned to Springfield last Thursday with the expectation that there would be a vote on SB 572, our comprehensive transit plan. However, the House Republicans again held firm that they were unwilling to support transit legislation without a capital infrastructure bill. Since transit is a truly regional, bipartisan issue that deserves bipartisan support, it was impossible to pass the transit bill with hardly any Republican support.
The newsletter goes on to note that the Governor and three of the four legislative leaders have pledged to work hard over the next two weeks to craft a long-term transit funding solution by coming up with a state-wide capital plan. (You can access the letters through the Hamos newsletter.) The lone holdout is Senate Minority Leader Frank Watson, perhaps smarting over the less than complete description of SB 572 contained in a letter he received from the RTA recently.
In any event, Representative Hamos closes her newsletter with the following: "I remain hopeful that the leaders will fashion a capital infrastructure bill that will pave the way for a successful vote on SB 572 in the next two weeks."
What, if any, of SB 572 will survive the legislative back and forth over the next days or weeks?
Is transit funding the only issue that needs to be resolved by the Governor and the legislative leaders or are the RTA "reform" provisions also up in the air?
Will the CTA unions agree to honor their concessions if a solution is not enacted before 2008? Are greater concessions possible in 2008 if the CTA's 2008 doomsday is even worse than the 2007 doomsday that was just averted?
Is the Governor or any of the legislative leaders inclined to radically reform the Chicago area public transit system by, for example, combining the Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace into the RTA as operating units of the RTA?
Will enough of SB 572 pass so that Representative Hamos can feel like the effort she has put into this issue has been worthwhile?
Sunday, November 4, 2007
The Farebox Recovery Ratio, Senator Watson And RTA Candor
Section 4.09(g) of RTA Act contains a requirement that the service boards--Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace--recover half of their operating costs from fares and other system generated revenue. The three service boards must generate sufficient revenue to meet 50 percent of their operating expenses. This is the so-called farebox recovery ratio. Because of existing exceptions already written into the RTA Act, the actual farebox recovery ratio is significantly lower than 50 percent. That is, public subsidies--i.e., tax revenue--cover significantly more than 50 percent of the cost of operating the RTA system and customer fares (and other system-generated revenue) cover significantly less than 50 percent of those costs.
The purpose of the farebox recovery ratio is to require the RTA and the service boards to step up and raise fares when necessary to keep the public subsidy of the public transit system at roughly 50 percent of the cost of providing the service. It is meant to provide an objective standard upon which the service boards can rely when going through the difficult and unpopular task of raising fares. The recovery ratio reflects the General Assembly's public policy judgment about how much public support the transit system in northeastern Illinois deserves and how much should be paid by the public transit customers.
Senate Minority leader Frank Watson has indicated that he views fare increases by the service boards as a necessary part of the solution to the transit funding problems that have occupied so much time and attention over the past year. He sent a letter to that effect to Jim Reilly, the head of the RTA, about a week ago.
Reilly's reply, available through the Capital Fax Blog (here) or upon request, urges Senator Watson to support SB 572. Reilly responds to Watson's request for a fare increase as follows:
You suggest that a moderate fare increase might be part of the solution. Certainly if the Governor and four leaders agree on that approach we would most definitely implement it but again the Auditor General's report makes it clear that a fare increase alone does not come close to solving the problem. SB 572 does continue the requirement that 50% of the costs of operating transit be received from the farebox so there will be a requirement for fare increases over time.
This statement is incomplete under even the most charitable interpretation of the letter. The RTA, speaking through its Chairman, seems to be telling Senator Watson that SB 572 retains the 50% farebox recovery ratio requirement of the current RTA Act and thus preserves the General Assembly's current policy balance between fares and public subsidies for the support of transit operations.
What the RTA failed to tell Senator Watson is that the current version of SB 572 contains major new exemptions that will mean in practice the actual farebox recovery ratio will fall even farther below the 50 percent farebox recovery ratio that will remain on the statute books. (See pages 206-08 of the bill.)
While the RTA may have been technically correct in telling Senator Watson that SB 572 retains the 50 percent farebox recovery ratio, it did its reputation for candor no service by failing to inform him of these major new exclusions and their effect on the proportion of public transit operations paid for by fare-paying customers and the proportion covered by public subsidies via regional and State tax revenue.
The purpose of the farebox recovery ratio is to require the RTA and the service boards to step up and raise fares when necessary to keep the public subsidy of the public transit system at roughly 50 percent of the cost of providing the service. It is meant to provide an objective standard upon which the service boards can rely when going through the difficult and unpopular task of raising fares. The recovery ratio reflects the General Assembly's public policy judgment about how much public support the transit system in northeastern Illinois deserves and how much should be paid by the public transit customers.
Senate Minority leader Frank Watson has indicated that he views fare increases by the service boards as a necessary part of the solution to the transit funding problems that have occupied so much time and attention over the past year. He sent a letter to that effect to Jim Reilly, the head of the RTA, about a week ago.
Reilly's reply, available through the Capital Fax Blog (here) or upon request, urges Senator Watson to support SB 572. Reilly responds to Watson's request for a fare increase as follows:
You suggest that a moderate fare increase might be part of the solution. Certainly if the Governor and four leaders agree on that approach we would most definitely implement it but again the Auditor General's report makes it clear that a fare increase alone does not come close to solving the problem. SB 572 does continue the requirement that 50% of the costs of operating transit be received from the farebox so there will be a requirement for fare increases over time.
This statement is incomplete under even the most charitable interpretation of the letter. The RTA, speaking through its Chairman, seems to be telling Senator Watson that SB 572 retains the 50% farebox recovery ratio requirement of the current RTA Act and thus preserves the General Assembly's current policy balance between fares and public subsidies for the support of transit operations.
What the RTA failed to tell Senator Watson is that the current version of SB 572 contains major new exemptions that will mean in practice the actual farebox recovery ratio will fall even farther below the 50 percent farebox recovery ratio that will remain on the statute books. (See pages 206-08 of the bill.)
- First, in calculating the farebox recovery ratio, the CTA and Metra (which SB 572 authorizes to issue up to $1 billion in debt) can exempt debt service from their operating expenses for purposes of calculating the farebox recovery ratio.
- Second, SB 572 provides that all passenger security expenses can be exempted from operating expenses, removing the current $5 million cap.
- Third, Pace can exclude from revenue grants it receives from the Suburban Community Mobility Fund, which should average $20 million each year under section 4.03.3(c)(i) of SB 572.
- Fourth, SB 572 lops off $200 million in costs from the calculation of the farebox recovery ratio in 2008. This amount of excluded costs reduces by $20 million a year over the next decade (e.g., $180 million in FY 2009).
While the RTA may have been technically correct in telling Senator Watson that SB 572 retains the 50 percent farebox recovery ratio, it did its reputation for candor no service by failing to inform him of these major new exclusions and their effect on the proportion of public transit operations paid for by fare-paying customers and the proportion covered by public subsidies via regional and State tax revenue.
Smart One: Doomsday Averted Once Again
Just as the first doomsday was set to arrive for the Chicago Transit Authority and Pace, transit apocalypse was averted when the State of Illinois and the federal government found a way to free up $27 million to keep Pace and the CTA afloat at current service/fare levels until at least the end of the year. From published reports (e.g., here), I hesitate to attempt to describe how the solution works. It appears that the FTA authorized the use of $27 million of federal capital funds for transit operating purposes. The State agreed to step up with $27 million of its capital dollars to fill the resulting hole. Essentially, this solution exploits the more liberal rules governing the use of federal capital funds for transit operations compared to State rules on the use of capital funds, a neat bit of arbitrage.
This last minute fix has all the earmarks of some smart person being creative and thinking outside of the proverbial box. It was a solution no one had discussed and "seemed to appear out of nowhere." Despite plenty of fulminating (here and here) about how the RTA no longer should accept short-term funding bailouts, the RTA and the service boards wasted no time in embracing this solution once the federal government gave the green light.
Who can we thank for this creative solution? Let's hope they get a raise and the opportunity to use that creativity on the many other challenges facing the Chicago area transit system even if a long-term operating and capital funding solution is enacted over the next few months. Of course, using capital dollars to fund operations is like eating your seed corn and is not sustainable in the long term. Nonetheless, the simple elegance of this latest short-term fix should be recognized.
This last minute fix has all the earmarks of some smart person being creative and thinking outside of the proverbial box. It was a solution no one had discussed and "seemed to appear out of nowhere." Despite plenty of fulminating (here and here) about how the RTA no longer should accept short-term funding bailouts, the RTA and the service boards wasted no time in embracing this solution once the federal government gave the green light.
Who can we thank for this creative solution? Let's hope they get a raise and the opportunity to use that creativity on the many other challenges facing the Chicago area transit system even if a long-term operating and capital funding solution is enacted over the next few months. Of course, using capital dollars to fund operations is like eating your seed corn and is not sustainable in the long term. Nonetheless, the simple elegance of this latest short-term fix should be recognized.
Thursday, November 1, 2007
Post-Doomsday: Will The Equity Questions Reemerge?
The Metropolitan Planning Council is alerting public-spirited folks with time on their hands next Monday to attend the following:
Chicago Transit Authority Press Event
Chicago Transit Authority Press Event
What: A press event to highlight the impact of the cuts and fare increases
When: Monday, Nov. 5, 11 a.m.
Where: Ogilvie Station, at Jefferson and Madison streets
This press event could be a real hoot if doomsday arrives on schedule. CTA management and its customers will be reeling from their first work day post-doomsday. They will be camped outside Ogilvie Station, from which puzzled Metra commuters will emerge wondering what the fuss is all about. After all, unlike Pace and the CTA, Metra is neither cutting service nor raising fares in this first doomsday. As for the second doomsday in January, when the CTA will truly gut its bus system and Pace becomes a shadow of its former self, Metra will raise its fares all of 10 percent and increase its unlimited ride weekend ticket from $5 to--you better sit down--$7.
The juxtaposition of the CTA folks standing in the street outside a Metra station highlighting the impact of the cuts and fare increases that affect everyone but Metra and its customers is striking. Maybe, just maybe, at this press event someone in attendance will raise the question, where is the fairness in that only two of the three service boards have to go through the first doomsday? Who was responsible for the financial oversight of the region's public transit system and how did they allow doomsday to fall so unevenly on the service boards? How is it that the service board with the most prosperous ridership base was spared the first doomsday round of service cuts and fare increases while the service boards serving the most transit-dependent populations must feel the pain? And when one looks at the racial composition of the customers served by the three service boards, which racial groups are bearing the brunt of the first doomsday cuts and fare increases and which are not?
Both the Moving Beyond Congestion effort and the SB 572 process were designed to steer clear of these kinds of questions. If they fail and doomsday does descend on two of three service boards, then maybe it is time to start asking those equity/justice questions.
SB 572 Sallies Forth Again
The House Mass Transit Committee has approved a revised version of the SB 572, in the form of Amendment No. 10 (here).
Please post in comments any significant changes you find in Amendment No. 10.
Please post in comments any significant changes you find in Amendment No. 10.
Gas Tax vs. Sales Tax: Which Wins?
In his statement today concerning public transit the Governor Blagojevich outlined his preferred plan to increase the level of transit funding:
The plan that I prefer would redirect – not increase – revenue from the existing sales tax on gas in Cook and the collar counties for the RTA. That’s money that is already collected from drivers who contribute to congested roads and air pollution in our region. It makes sense to dedicate that revenue to mass transit, and it also helps reduce congestion and air pollution.
The remaining hole in the state budget can then be filled with revenue from an expansion of gaming in Illinois – an expansion that every one of the legislative leaders has already agreed needs to get done to fund a statewide infrastructure plan.
There are some things to like about this approach, which appears to have the support of the Republican leaders and perhaps Senator Jones. The Governor recognizes that linking the gas tax (or more precisely the sales tax on gas) to transit makes good public policy. Drivers who create congestion, who benefit from the congestion relief benefits of public transit, and who contribute a large measure of air pollution, including greenhouse gases, properly are called upon to subsidize transit service. Those who drive the most tend to pay the most, which creates a bit of an economic incentive against sprawl.
While the Governor appears unwilling to increase the gas tax (or embrace congestion pricing for that matter) to reduce the congestion and pollution resulting from excessive private auto use relative to road capacity, linking transit funding to the gas tax is something that his successor can build on to start pricing auto travel in a way that promotes the most efficient use of the Chicago region's highway and transit systems.
The Governor's gas tax plan takes existing gas tax revenue from the six-county Northeastern Illinois region and applies ("diverts" in some eyes no doubt) that revenue to the region's public transit system. Filling the resulting hole in the State budget becomes someone else's problem while the RTA, the Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace spend their new money. This is not a bad scenario if you are a transit supporter.
The Governor recommends that revenue from expanded gambling can fill the hole in the State budget created by the application of the gas tax monies to transit. There is something to like here as well, especially if you live in northeastern Illinois. A fair amount of that revenue will be generated from people from outside northeastern Illinois or even Illinois itself who gamble when visiting Chicago or other Illinois gambling facilities. The burden of transit funding thus is spread outside of the six-county region, another nice benefit for that region. The region gets the gas tax revenue for its public transit system but is not completely on the hook to fill the resulting hole in the State budget.
Using gambling revenue to replace the gas tax monies used for transit could put the City of Chicago is a difficult spot, however. On the one hand, the City presumably wants to find a source of funding for CTA and Metra service that serves the City. On the other hand, if that source of money requires the City to give up proceeds from a Chicago casino that would otherwise go to the City, then transit doomsday might not look so bad to the City.
In contrast, the sales tax built into SB 572 is not as directly tied to transit or driving. Charging a bit higher sales tax on a big screen TV, for example, is not likely to prompt anyone to change their driving habits. The sales tax has proved insufficient to keep up with transit agency costs, so it is a matter of time--likely only a few years--before the proposed sales tax increase in SB 572 proves inadequate for the transit agencies to maintain their current service levels. The increased reliance on the sales tax does not help the RTA diversify its funding base, even though such diversification is key to the long-term financial health of the public transit system.
When it comes to the predictability of revenue the sales tax wins. One virtue of the sales tax is that is does not vary that much from year to year. In contrast, a sales tax on gasoline sales is likely to bounce around with the changes gas prices.
On balance, however, taxing driving to pay for transit is at least as good an alternative as the sales tax to provide funding for transit. In many respects, a gas tax is superior.
Surely it is possible to amend SB 572 to swap out the sales tax increase in favor of the redirection of the sales tax revenue on gas, leaving in the CTA union concessions and the much ballyhooed RTA reforms. Hopefully, someone is work on that right now.
The plan that I prefer would redirect – not increase – revenue from the existing sales tax on gas in Cook and the collar counties for the RTA. That’s money that is already collected from drivers who contribute to congested roads and air pollution in our region. It makes sense to dedicate that revenue to mass transit, and it also helps reduce congestion and air pollution.
The remaining hole in the state budget can then be filled with revenue from an expansion of gaming in Illinois – an expansion that every one of the legislative leaders has already agreed needs to get done to fund a statewide infrastructure plan.
There are some things to like about this approach, which appears to have the support of the Republican leaders and perhaps Senator Jones. The Governor recognizes that linking the gas tax (or more precisely the sales tax on gas) to transit makes good public policy. Drivers who create congestion, who benefit from the congestion relief benefits of public transit, and who contribute a large measure of air pollution, including greenhouse gases, properly are called upon to subsidize transit service. Those who drive the most tend to pay the most, which creates a bit of an economic incentive against sprawl.
While the Governor appears unwilling to increase the gas tax (or embrace congestion pricing for that matter) to reduce the congestion and pollution resulting from excessive private auto use relative to road capacity, linking transit funding to the gas tax is something that his successor can build on to start pricing auto travel in a way that promotes the most efficient use of the Chicago region's highway and transit systems.
The Governor's gas tax plan takes existing gas tax revenue from the six-county Northeastern Illinois region and applies ("diverts" in some eyes no doubt) that revenue to the region's public transit system. Filling the resulting hole in the State budget becomes someone else's problem while the RTA, the Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and Pace spend their new money. This is not a bad scenario if you are a transit supporter.
The Governor recommends that revenue from expanded gambling can fill the hole in the State budget created by the application of the gas tax monies to transit. There is something to like here as well, especially if you live in northeastern Illinois. A fair amount of that revenue will be generated from people from outside northeastern Illinois or even Illinois itself who gamble when visiting Chicago or other Illinois gambling facilities. The burden of transit funding thus is spread outside of the six-county region, another nice benefit for that region. The region gets the gas tax revenue for its public transit system but is not completely on the hook to fill the resulting hole in the State budget.
Using gambling revenue to replace the gas tax monies used for transit could put the City of Chicago is a difficult spot, however. On the one hand, the City presumably wants to find a source of funding for CTA and Metra service that serves the City. On the other hand, if that source of money requires the City to give up proceeds from a Chicago casino that would otherwise go to the City, then transit doomsday might not look so bad to the City.
In contrast, the sales tax built into SB 572 is not as directly tied to transit or driving. Charging a bit higher sales tax on a big screen TV, for example, is not likely to prompt anyone to change their driving habits. The sales tax has proved insufficient to keep up with transit agency costs, so it is a matter of time--likely only a few years--before the proposed sales tax increase in SB 572 proves inadequate for the transit agencies to maintain their current service levels. The increased reliance on the sales tax does not help the RTA diversify its funding base, even though such diversification is key to the long-term financial health of the public transit system.
When it comes to the predictability of revenue the sales tax wins. One virtue of the sales tax is that is does not vary that much from year to year. In contrast, a sales tax on gasoline sales is likely to bounce around with the changes gas prices.
On balance, however, taxing driving to pay for transit is at least as good an alternative as the sales tax to provide funding for transit. In many respects, a gas tax is superior.
Surely it is possible to amend SB 572 to swap out the sales tax increase in favor of the redirection of the sales tax revenue on gas, leaving in the CTA union concessions and the much ballyhooed RTA reforms. Hopefully, someone is work on that right now.
SB 572: Let The Bidding For Votes Begin?
It's time to check back in with SB 572.
Representative Sidney Mathias filed House Amendment No. 7 to SB 572 on October 11, 2007. The amendment will obligate the RTA to make an annual grant of $250,000 to the Intertownship Transportation Program for Northwest Suburban Cook County. The ITPNSCC was created in 2004 as part of the the Illinois Transit Ridership and Economic Development (TRED) Pilot Project Program. ITPNSCC provides medical care related trips for senior citizens and disabled persons.
Representative Mathias is a Republican. He signed on as a co-sponsor of SB 572 at the end of May. In contrast, most of his suburban Republican Party colleagues opposed SB 572 when it came to a vote in September.
Does Mathias' Amendment No. 7 provide a model of what will be necessary to get suburban politicians on the SB 572 bandwagon? Will we see a string of $250,000 van pool service grants written into the RTA Act to encourage other suburban politicians to support SB 572?
Representative Sidney Mathias filed House Amendment No. 7 to SB 572 on October 11, 2007. The amendment will obligate the RTA to make an annual grant of $250,000 to the Intertownship Transportation Program for Northwest Suburban Cook County. The ITPNSCC was created in 2004 as part of the the Illinois Transit Ridership and Economic Development (TRED) Pilot Project Program. ITPNSCC provides medical care related trips for senior citizens and disabled persons.
Representative Mathias is a Republican. He signed on as a co-sponsor of SB 572 at the end of May. In contrast, most of his suburban Republican Party colleagues opposed SB 572 when it came to a vote in September.
Does Mathias' Amendment No. 7 provide a model of what will be necessary to get suburban politicians on the SB 572 bandwagon? Will we see a string of $250,000 van pool service grants written into the RTA Act to encourage other suburban politicians to support SB 572?
SB 572 Amendments: O'McHenry Has To Go
I've argued before that McHenry County (and possibly Kane County) should be booted from the RTA family for chronic whining and ingratitude. Representative Jack Franks, a suburban Democrat representing McHenry County who voted against SB 572, has introduced two amendments to SB 572 that help make my case that McHenry County should be granted its wish to leave the RTA.
Amendment No. 8 exempts McHenry County from the increase in the collar country RTA sales tax from 0.25% to 0.50%.
Amendment No. 9 provides that individual counties can block tax increases adopted by the RTA Board pursuant to SB 572.
Let's just take McHenry County out of the RTA. Its contribution of sales tax revenue is relatively small. Due to the County's embrace of sprawl-type development the cost of providing transit service in the area is very high. If McHenry County wants transit service, let it contract with Metra or Pace for such service or figure out a way to provide it on its own. The County's incessant digs at the RTA beg for (a) calling the County's bluff by threatening to cast it out of the RTA family or (b) casting it out and letting the County pay for whatever level of public transit service it deems fit for itself.
Isn't it time to focus public transit on counties that have a commitment to fund such service and who embrace land use policies that support the kinds of densities required for a viable public transit system? Let McHenry County go. Let's make Cal Skinner's day. He is a McHenry County figure who was a major opponent of the RTA in 1983. In this post he reports that George Ranney, one of the key supporters of the RTA back then (and now), stated during the run-up to the referendum that led to the creation of the RTA that it was a mistake to include McHenry County in the RTA. Someone please use SB 572 to fix that mistake.
Amendment No. 8 exempts McHenry County from the increase in the collar country RTA sales tax from 0.25% to 0.50%.
Amendment No. 9 provides that individual counties can block tax increases adopted by the RTA Board pursuant to SB 572.
Let's just take McHenry County out of the RTA. Its contribution of sales tax revenue is relatively small. Due to the County's embrace of sprawl-type development the cost of providing transit service in the area is very high. If McHenry County wants transit service, let it contract with Metra or Pace for such service or figure out a way to provide it on its own. The County's incessant digs at the RTA beg for (a) calling the County's bluff by threatening to cast it out of the RTA family or (b) casting it out and letting the County pay for whatever level of public transit service it deems fit for itself.
Isn't it time to focus public transit on counties that have a commitment to fund such service and who embrace land use policies that support the kinds of densities required for a viable public transit system? Let McHenry County go. Let's make Cal Skinner's day. He is a McHenry County figure who was a major opponent of the RTA in 1983. In this post he reports that George Ranney, one of the key supporters of the RTA back then (and now), stated during the run-up to the referendum that led to the creation of the RTA that it was a mistake to include McHenry County in the RTA. Someone please use SB 572 to fix that mistake.
Transit Rally Monday 11/5/07
News of this upcoming rally is circulating through the usual channels:
There are just a few days left before communities across Northeastern Illinois face severe transit cuts and huge fare increases. We need your help to hold lawmakers accountable for failing to act to adequately fund transit and reform the transit agencies.
Join Illinois PIRG and other transit advocates at a rally to save transit.
What: A rally to save transit – and hold our elected officials accountable!
When: Monday, November 5th at 12:00 Noon
Where: Thompson Center Plaza at the corner of Randolph and Clark
Organizers include Illinois PIRG, TransitFuture, and SaveChicagolandTransit.
RSVP here.
There are just a few days left before communities across Northeastern Illinois face severe transit cuts and huge fare increases. We need your help to hold lawmakers accountable for failing to act to adequately fund transit and reform the transit agencies.
Join Illinois PIRG and other transit advocates at a rally to save transit.
What: A rally to save transit – and hold our elected officials accountable!
When: Monday, November 5th at 12:00 Noon
Where: Thompson Center Plaza at the corner of Randolph and Clark
Organizers include Illinois PIRG, TransitFuture, and SaveChicagolandTransit.
RSVP here.
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
Politician Scorecard: Who Supports SB 572
Kind reader Matt Maldre has created a map showing where the votes for SB 572 came from when it was voted on by the House in September. His accompanying commentary browbeats the suburban Republicans who voted no despite the high per-ride public subsidies for Metra and Pace.
He has also prepared a downloadable flyer targeted at the representatives who voted against SB 572 but who represent areas served by Metra's line to Elgin. He asks that you print them out and distribute them.
Those representatives who voted against SB 572 even those they and their constituents benefit from the Elgin Metra line and other public transit services are: Timothy Schmitz, Ruth Munson, Harry Ranney, Fred Crespo, Franco Coladipietro, Dennis Reboletti, and Angelo Saviano.
It may make folks feel better to yell at Ron Huberman, but these seven representatives are key to getting SB 572 through the House. Act accordingly if you want SB 572 to pass.
He has also prepared a downloadable flyer targeted at the representatives who voted against SB 572 but who represent areas served by Metra's line to Elgin. He asks that you print them out and distribute them.
Those representatives who voted against SB 572 even those they and their constituents benefit from the Elgin Metra line and other public transit services are: Timothy Schmitz, Ruth Munson, Harry Ranney, Fred Crespo, Franco Coladipietro, Dennis Reboletti, and Angelo Saviano.
It may make folks feel better to yell at Ron Huberman, but these seven representatives are key to getting SB 572 through the House. Act accordingly if you want SB 572 to pass.
Saturday, October 27, 2007
Herald Of The Apocalypse
West North blog has a recent post by Payton Chung entitled "CTA Bus Cuts In Perspective" that got picked up Friday by Capitol Fax Blog to leaven its discussion of transit funding issues.
The post starts with the ridership on the 84 CTA bus routes that the CTA will cut when implementing the November and January doomsdays (308,262). Since cars on average carry only 1.2 passengers, this is the equivalent of "256,885 cars a day of capacity." The author points out that this figure is higher than the traffic volume at certain points on major local expressways and even approaches Metra's daily ridership.
The author then zooms in for the kill:
If the Kennedy bridge at Fullerton collapsed, or if terrorists took out both I-55 and Lake Shore Drive, or if Metra just up and died, how would this state’s government react? I bet they wouldn’t spend years squabbling, dilly-dallying, grand-standing, and pork-padding.
Sure, people will adapt to bus route elimination (reducing trips, taking alternate routes and modes), but they’d adapt to a freeway shutdown, too.
This is over the top, and not in a helpful way. It is wrong to assume that each trip on a bus route that is being eliminated will result in a new car on the road. If the typical trip on transit is to and from a work, school or other location, then 308,000 trips would represent about 150,000 new cars even if we assume that everyone taking the bus is going to use a car if the bus route is cut.
This assumption, however, doesn't stack up either. First, as the author recognizes, at least some of those taking bus routes that will be eliminated will switch to other public transit routes. Second, others will switch to different transportation modes, such as biking, scooters, car pools, taxis, and walking. Third, a certain percentage of people currently using the bus routes being eliminated will take fewer trips overall.
While it is dramatic to suggest that an inflated projection of new autos on the road is higher than the number of vehicles that pass through certain points on major highways, that observation overlooks the fact that the CTA bus lines being cut are spread around Chicago and the inner suburbs. Not all the folks whose bus lines are being cut, for example, will be traveling on the Kennedy Expressway at Fullerton. Some are going to the Loop. Some are going to the suburbs. Some are going to other parts of Chicago.
What is the capacity of the Chicago streets and highways to absorb the additional traffic generated from the elimination of these CTA bus lines? I haven't found a source for how many miles of streets are in Chicago. The Encyclopedia of Chicago says that "by the 1990s, the Chicago metropolitan area had 54,600 miles of streets and roads, including 2,500 miles of expressways, 17,300 miles of highways and arterial streets, and 34,800 miles of local streets."
Let's assume (a) that Chicago has 10,000 miles of streets and roads, a figure likely less than its actual complement, (b) 100,000 of the riders on the CTA bus routes being cut switch to cars, and (c) all their trips are in Chicago. This means that we have 10 additional cars per mile of available street. But, of course, we don't all travel at the same time. If we divide by 24 hours in the day, this results in 0.42 new cars per mile. Let's divide by 10, however, which leaves 1 additional car per mile.
Overstating the "devastating" consequences of the impending cuts and engaging in overblown rhetoric (e.g., equating the effect of the cuts to "terrorism") will further undermine the credibility of the public transit providers and their supporters. Folks are already suffering from "doomsday fatigue" after several years of doomsday scenarios. If the apocalypse fails to materialize when the doomsdays finally arrive, who is going to believe the public transit proponents the next time doomsday fever hits the town.
Let me be clear: There are going to be adverse consequences from the CTA bus line cuts and in some areas these consequences are going to be quite noticeable. In most of the city, however, these effects are going to be barely felt during most or all of the day because the current level of transit ridership in those areas is not that high. In denser areas already facing traffic congestion challenges and with heavier existing transit ridership, the effects will be more severe, especially during rush hour. These localized impacts, however, hardly add up to a city-wide apocalypse.
Rather than fear mongering, we should focus on dealing with those localized effects. There are a range of tools, including encouraging private sector transit (e.g., van pools), improving bike commuting options, and more efficiently utilizing our stock of automobiles through shared vehicle services like I-Go and ride-sharing social networking platforms like GoLoco.
The key problem is that our transit agencies are neither empowered nor inclined to roll out such alternatives to their services. Their hopes lie with SB 572 and its continuation of business as usual with an RTA twist or two and lots more operating subsidies.
The post starts with the ridership on the 84 CTA bus routes that the CTA will cut when implementing the November and January doomsdays (308,262). Since cars on average carry only 1.2 passengers, this is the equivalent of "256,885 cars a day of capacity." The author points out that this figure is higher than the traffic volume at certain points on major local expressways and even approaches Metra's daily ridership.
The author then zooms in for the kill:
If the Kennedy bridge at Fullerton collapsed, or if terrorists took out both I-55 and Lake Shore Drive, or if Metra just up and died, how would this state’s government react? I bet they wouldn’t spend years squabbling, dilly-dallying, grand-standing, and pork-padding.
Sure, people will adapt to bus route elimination (reducing trips, taking alternate routes and modes), but they’d adapt to a freeway shutdown, too.
This is over the top, and not in a helpful way. It is wrong to assume that each trip on a bus route that is being eliminated will result in a new car on the road. If the typical trip on transit is to and from a work, school or other location, then 308,000 trips would represent about 150,000 new cars even if we assume that everyone taking the bus is going to use a car if the bus route is cut.
This assumption, however, doesn't stack up either. First, as the author recognizes, at least some of those taking bus routes that will be eliminated will switch to other public transit routes. Second, others will switch to different transportation modes, such as biking, scooters, car pools, taxis, and walking. Third, a certain percentage of people currently using the bus routes being eliminated will take fewer trips overall.
While it is dramatic to suggest that an inflated projection of new autos on the road is higher than the number of vehicles that pass through certain points on major highways, that observation overlooks the fact that the CTA bus lines being cut are spread around Chicago and the inner suburbs. Not all the folks whose bus lines are being cut, for example, will be traveling on the Kennedy Expressway at Fullerton. Some are going to the Loop. Some are going to the suburbs. Some are going to other parts of Chicago.
What is the capacity of the Chicago streets and highways to absorb the additional traffic generated from the elimination of these CTA bus lines? I haven't found a source for how many miles of streets are in Chicago. The Encyclopedia of Chicago says that "by the 1990s, the Chicago metropolitan area had 54,600 miles of streets and roads, including 2,500 miles of expressways, 17,300 miles of highways and arterial streets, and 34,800 miles of local streets."
Let's assume (a) that Chicago has 10,000 miles of streets and roads, a figure likely less than its actual complement, (b) 100,000 of the riders on the CTA bus routes being cut switch to cars, and (c) all their trips are in Chicago. This means that we have 10 additional cars per mile of available street. But, of course, we don't all travel at the same time. If we divide by 24 hours in the day, this results in 0.42 new cars per mile. Let's divide by 10, however, which leaves 1 additional car per mile.
Overstating the "devastating" consequences of the impending cuts and engaging in overblown rhetoric (e.g., equating the effect of the cuts to "terrorism") will further undermine the credibility of the public transit providers and their supporters. Folks are already suffering from "doomsday fatigue" after several years of doomsday scenarios. If the apocalypse fails to materialize when the doomsdays finally arrive, who is going to believe the public transit proponents the next time doomsday fever hits the town.
Let me be clear: There are going to be adverse consequences from the CTA bus line cuts and in some areas these consequences are going to be quite noticeable. In most of the city, however, these effects are going to be barely felt during most or all of the day because the current level of transit ridership in those areas is not that high. In denser areas already facing traffic congestion challenges and with heavier existing transit ridership, the effects will be more severe, especially during rush hour. These localized impacts, however, hardly add up to a city-wide apocalypse.
Rather than fear mongering, we should focus on dealing with those localized effects. There are a range of tools, including encouraging private sector transit (e.g., van pools), improving bike commuting options, and more efficiently utilizing our stock of automobiles through shared vehicle services like I-Go and ride-sharing social networking platforms like GoLoco.
The key problem is that our transit agencies are neither empowered nor inclined to roll out such alternatives to their services. Their hopes lie with SB 572 and its continuation of business as usual with an RTA twist or two and lots more operating subsidies.
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